











‘Joining the Club’ 
The place of a Chinese 
School in the global IR 
academy
THØGER KERSTING CHRISTENSEN
Since the 1970s, international relations (IR) as a discipline has been 
called an ‘American social science’. However, despite persistent 
criticism, Western-centrism still permeates the discipline today. 
In response, Chinese scholars are debating whether to create a 
Chinese IR theory, most recently in the form of a ‘Chinese School 
of IR’. This article focuses on the three main scholars in the debate 
– Qin Yaqing, Yan Xuetong and Zhao Tingyang – and their theories. 
Through a bibliometric study of IR periodicals published by Chinese 
institutions, the paper seeks to measure the influence of the new 
theories domestically and the Chinese School’s position in the global 
structure of IR knowledge production. Finally, it critically evaluates 
the theories’ relationship to existing Western-centric IR theory. All 
of this is done in order to assess whether Chinese IR theory can 
be considered a paradigm-shifting phenomenon. The article finds 
that Western-centric IR – both from an institutional and ideational 
perspective – continues to dominate the discipline. Furthermore, 
creating national schools in response to Western hegemony runs the 
risk of reproducing the problematic tropes of mainstream IR. China’s 
growing role in the world, its cultural and intellectual tradition, and 
its sheer proportion of the world population all speak in favour 
of its potential to emancipate global IR. However, in striving for a 
truly global discipline, scholars will need to adopt a critical stand 
against existing IR theory and seek a broader interpretation of what 
constitutes China.








 Despite its name, the field of international relations has long been criticised for being parochial (Kristensen, 2015) and serving 
a Western outlook (Hobson, 2012) - it has even 
been called an ‘American social science’ (Hoff man, 
1977; Smith, 2000). Critics claim that the field’s 
universalisation of the Western experience has 
served to downplay the role of imperialism and 
colonialism. The discipline assumes an idealised world 
structured around arbitrary dates such as 1648, the 
Treaty of Westphalia, and the supposed foundation 
of the discipline in 1919 (Carvalho et al. 2011). The 
earlier roots of the discipline in fields such as racial 
science and colonial administration are ignored, as 
is the fact that one of the discipline’s most trusted 
periodicals, Foreign Aff airs, was founded in 1911 as 
The Journal of Racial Development (Vitalis, 2000). 
With the emergence of critical, feminist and 
postcolonial IR studies, and the rise of developing 
non-Western countries such as the BRIC block, 
voices criticising subliminal Western-centrism in IR 
theory have grown more acute. The fact that these 
‘new’ powers seemed to arise at the same time as the 
economies of established powers were floundering 
has reignited bouts of Western defeatism 
(Ferguson, 2011; Goldberg, 2018). Arguably, none of 
the newcomers spurs more attention, fascination or 
concern as China. A growing interest in China and 
its global vision carried popular titles as What Does 
China Think (Leonard, 2008) and When China Rules 
the World (Jacques, 2009). However, in the Western 
IR communities, rising powers continue to be 
studied mainly as objects rather than subjects able 
to ‘speak’ or theorise themselves (Kristensen, 2015). 
A call for a global IR by concerned IR scholars 
Acharya and Buzan (2007) reenergised the debate 
for indigenous theory inside China. The potential 
for a Chinese School of IR inspired by the English 
and Copenhagen Schools has been a hotly debated 
topic for decades since Liang Shoude called for an 
“IR discipline with Chinese characteristics” (Liang, 
1994). Recently, Chinese scholars have moved into a 
new phase formulating theories founded on Chinese 
history and philosophy (Qin, 2018; Zhang and 
Chang, 2016; Zhao, 2016; Yan, [2011] 2013). In this 
paper I discuss the potential for a Chinese School to 
challenge the Western-centric structure of IR both 
ideationally and from an institutional perspective 
by surveying more than 2,500 IR articles published 
from 2013-2017 in Chinese academic periodicals. In 
addition, I introduce a comparative angle as four 
periodicals are published in English and five in 
Chinese. The purpose is to investigate how much 
of the Chinese IR community is engaging in theory 
innovation, how much of this work promotes new 
theory based on Chinese resources, and how the new 
theories relate to existing IR and Western-centrism.
The stratified structure of the IR academy
Charges  of Western-centrism in IR have taken 
diff erent forms including institutional bias 
(Reingewertz and Lutwar, 2017), epistemological 
inflexibility (Brincat and Ling, 2014), cultural 
exceptionalism (Hobson, 2012), developmental 
determinism (Hoogvelt, 1997) and a lack of non-
Western agency (Kayaoglu, 2010). An illustration 
of the stratified institutional structure of the 
IR community is the “hub-and-spokes system” 
(Kristensen, 2015) in which core scholars, largely 
made up by an Anglo-American institutional elite, 
dominate. As Kristensen puts it, “it is the privilege 
of ‘core’ scholars to theorise, while periphery 
scholars do not speak back to the core, except 
perhaps in the sense of providing some raw 
empirical materials.” (Kristensen, 2015, p. 214). 
Voices addressing these structural imbalances 
are either welcomed (Acharya, 2016) or met 
by resistance. Influential realist scholar John 
Mearsheimer portrays this exclusion in terms of 
scarcity: “[T]here are limited opportunities in 2015 
for scholars outside the United States – as well 
inside it – to develop wholly new theories. If this were 
1945, the situation would be markedly diff erent” 
(Mearsheimer, 2016, p.2). There is a feeling in the 
more entrenched parts of the academy that IR is 












and that it has reached its own end-of-history. That 
being the case, Chinese scholars are working to 
construct IR theories from Chinese resources either 
to contribute to existing research paradigms (Yan 
[2011] 2013) or as a new ‘school of IR’ (Zhang and 
Chang, 2016). Three of the main figures to emerge 
in the debate are Qin Yaqing, Yan Xuetong and 
Zhao Tingyang. The paper continues with a brief 
outline of the content of these scholars’ theories, 
which is followed by the methodological approach 
of the survey. I then discuss how the sanctioned 
sources react to the existing mainstream theories.
Sanctioned sources of the Chinese School of IR
Although the debate around a Chinese School of 
IR has gained attention from a number of scholars, 
three scholars in particular have emerged as the 
main figures in the debate. I refer to their work as 
sanctioned partly because of their domestic status 
as eminent scholars that was revealed by surveying 
their Chinese peers (Kristensen, 2015, p.327) and 
partly because of their recognition globally as key 
representatives of a Chinese School. Qin, Yan, and 
Zhao have been called ”main contributors” (Demir, 
2018, p.96), “the three bigs of Chinese IR” (Babones, 
2018) and “leading scholars” (Cunningham-Cross, 
Figure 1. The stratified structure of knowledge production in the international IR community. The Anglo-American core 
of the global IR works as central disseminator of knowledge to the peripheral cores, which as subjugated entities are 








2014, p.6) by Western IR scholars. This is not to 
say that these particular scholars are necessarily 
ideal proponents of an imagined Chinese School, 
but they have become recognised as such by the 
core of the international IR academy, willingly or not. 
Qin Yaqing - The proponent
Qin Yaqing, professor at China Foreign Aff airs 
University, is strongly associated with the quest to 
build a Chinese School of IR (Kristensen, 2015, p.332). 
In his work, Qin draws extensively on Confucian 
philosophy of relations, Daoist cosmology, and 
also channels the sociologist Fei Xiaotong. Qin 
defines IR theory as having a hard core composed 
of a substantive and metaphysical component. 
According to him, the Western IR traditions have 
diff erent substantive components – power in realism, 
institutions in liberalism, norms in constructivism 
– but a consistent meta-physical component, 
rationality (Qin, 2016, p.34). He coins his own 
approach to IR theory as relational constructivism 
structured around the meta-physical component 
of relationality. Instead of looking at pre-conceived 
individual actors, Qin focuses on the relations 
and processes of these actors. Overemphasising 
the Western constructivist focus on identity 
formation as an internal process, Qin borrows from 
Fei Xiaotong and locates this formation solely as 
revealed through relations between actors. As an 
example, in a typical IR scenario what is considered 
rational US nuclear policy diff ers widely depending 
on whether it is engaging with a rival such as Iran or 
an ally such as the UK (ibid, p.36). Furthermore, Qin 
also advances an alternative to Western Hegelian 
dialectics inspired by Daoist cosmology and the 
Confucian Classic, The Doctrine of the Mean or 
Zhongyong. Zhongyong dialectics look to engage 
and accept contradictions and create polarity 
without duality in contrast to Hegelian dialectics: 
Like their Western counterparts, the Chinese 
conceptualise the universe in a polar way, 
believing that progress and evolution take place 
by interaction of the two opposite poles [...]. [T]
he Confucian tradition understands them in an 
immanent way. They interact not as the thesis 
and antithesis, but as co-theses. 
(Qin, 2016, p.39)
This concept opens up to new avenues of research 
such as relational power, relational governance and 
relational international systems (ibid, pp. 41-45).
Yan Xuetong - The opponent
In opposition to Qin Yaqing is Professor Yan 
Xuetong from Tsinghua University who has almost 
accidentally become the leading figure of the 
Tsinghua approach, a common denominator for 
scholars using ancient Chinese sources to enrich 
existing, especially realist, IR theory (Cunningham-
Cross, 2014, p.181). A long-time public intellectual 
often weighing in on Chinese foreign policy, Yan is a 
staunch opponent of the Chinese School label – he 
advocates a scientific, positivist approach to social 
sciences closely aligned with the US empiricist 
tradition. For Yan, a Chinese School of IR is as of little 
use as a “Chinese School of physics or chemistry” 
(Yan, [2011] 2013, p.216). Including Yan Xuetong 
in a discussion on Chinese IR theory is therefore 
controversial, as he insists that he is merely adding 
perspectives to existing (Western) theory. However, 
as Yan himself argues, it is not up to scholars 
themselves to coin academic schools (ibid, pp.252-
253), and he has willingly or not become a central 
part of the discourse on building Chinese IR theory 
(Demir, 2017; Kristensten 2015; Cunningham-Cross 
2014b; Kai 2012; Zhang 2012). Yan would no doubt 
claim that through his Tsinghua approach that he 
is merely creating universal IR theory. However, the 
rationale of his work does not rest upon just any 
strain of intellectual thought but exclusively invokes 
ancient Chinese philosophers and concepts such as 
moral realism and humane authority. As such both 
he and Qin Yaqing agree that Chinese intellectual 
culture is an important resource from which to 












Yan’s objections to the term a Chinese School might 
be more a problem of phrasing than an unbridgeable 
gap between the two (Zhang, 2012). For this 
reason Yan has also become a central figure in the 
discussion of how Chinese culture might invigorate 
IR theory and guide Chinese foreign policy. The 
central question for Yan is “how China can become 
the leading power in the world and what kind of world 
leadership it can provide” (Yan, [2011] 2013, p.216). 
Although considered a hawk and ”neo-comm” by 
some (Leonard, 2008, p.112), he also expresses 
belief in the peaceful rise of China managed 
through adherence to moral realism, which in 
practice means drawing foreign policy lessons from 
ancient Chinese philosophers. This link is clearly 
emphasised in the title of his book, Ancient Chinese 
Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Yan, [2011] 2013). 
In the realist tradition of might-makes-right, Yan 
sees the domination of states as a constant and 
natural occurrence in international politics. He 
believes China can become a dominating state by 
learning from the mistakes of the US, which he calls 
a hegemon, and instead cultivate harmony and 
strive to become a “humane authority” (ibid, p.39).
Zhao Tingyang  - The outsider
The last influential thinker in advancing Chinese 
IR theory is Zhao Tingyang, who is associated 
with promoting a revamped conception of the 
tianxia system. The original tianxia system, literally 
translated as all-under-heaven, refers to the pre-Qin 
interstate system that existed between 1045-221 
BCE approximately. During this period, the rule of 
Zhou over the other Chinese states was, according 
to Zhao, a “political institutional revolution not built 
on force, but on morality and the common good” 
(Zhao 2012, pp.55-56). It is important to keep in 
mind that just as with the “Westphalian myth of 
IR” (Carvalho et al. 2011), the reality of this 800 
year period was much more complex – after all, 
it was not called the Warring States period for its 
adherence to morality and stability (Hui, 2004). 
As a philosopher, and as such less associated 
with the IR community, Zhao is pushing for the most 
idealistic and normative project of the three scholars: 
a hyper-institutionalised world government and a 
world constitution that will entrench a philosophy of 
worldness (Zhao, 2012, p.64). Tianxia has become 
one of the most widely discussed ideas related to 
Chinese IR, partly due to its perceived impact on 
policy-making (Callahan, 2008). It is speculative 
at best to establish causality between academia 
and politics, but some scholars have pointed 
out similarities between Hu Jintao’s concept of 
harmonious world and Zhao’s tianxia system (ibid). 
Taking his point of departure in a critical assessment 
of the current state of international aff airs as a failed 
world, he seeks to go beyond the nation-centrism 
of Western IR theory by inducing the concept of 
worldness into international theory (Zhao, 2009, p.6). 
Just like his two colleagues, Zhao finds inspiration 
in the pre-Qin micro-cosmos of interstate activity 
taking Confucian relationism as a metaphysical 
component very similar to Qin’s conception of 
relationality (Zhao, 2012, p.49). Zhao argues for 
inherent diff erences in the Western and Chinese 
worldviews, seeing the former as embodied in the 
multipolarity of ancient Greek political states and 
the latter in the moral hierarchy of the Zhou Dynasty. 
This bipolarity opens up for a return of Hegelian 
dialectics, which I return to later in the discussion. 
Methods and Data
Having briefly accounted for the three most 
prominent scholars in the Chinese School of IR 
debate, I now turn to data to analyse to what a 
degree their ideas hold sway in the wider Chinese 
IR community. I survey 2,544 IR articles published 
between 2013 and 2017 (see Figure 2). The articles 
included in the sample come from nine journals 
and include prefaces and interviews, but exclude 
literature reviews, conference summaries and 
calls for submissions. I also include a comparative 
angle to investigate and compare the contents 
of Anglophone publications with Sinophone 



















by Chinese institutions in diff erent languages, 
I hope to highlight potential diff ering priorities 
in the internal debate among Chinese-speaking 
scholars and the Anglophone periodicals 
that are directed at international audiences. 
The purpose of bibliometric studies is to 
measure a discipline through published research, 
whether using journals, textbooks or curricula 
(Kristensen, 2015, p.213). In the present survey, 
I focus on the articles’ theoretical framework in 
order to map the landscape of IR in China. The 
approach is inspired by Peter M. Kristensen’s 
bibliometric study of IR in rising powers (2015) and 
Qin Yaqing’s stocktaking measure (2011a), but will 
diff er in certain key ways. By looking at the entire 
production of IR articles, I aim to discover how 
large a proportion theory innovation occupies. By 
measuring the proportion of IR theory in general, 
and then focusing on research related to the quest 
of developing Chinese IR theory, I get an empirical 
foundation upon which to assess whether Chinese 
IR theory is challenging mainstream IR theory 
in China. The surveyed Sinophone publications 
are some of the most cited and influential IR 
publications according the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science (Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences Evaluation Center 2014). In addition, I have 
included all available Anglophone publications. 
It is possible to select publications with a larger 
representation of theory-oriented articles, but 
this survey aims to discover the amount of theory 
production in the most influential periodicals. 
Through the coding of the articles, I first 
determine whether the article is mainly analytical 
or if it seeks to break new ground in theory 
innovation. This categorisation was achieved 
through selective reading with a focus on the 
abstract, theory and conclusions of each article. If 
a clear source of theory is discernible, I note the 
source. Here I categorise theories into three main 
groups: a Chinese paradigm (including keywords 
such as Chinese School, Confucianism, dynastic 
sources, Maoism, pre-Qin sources, socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, tianxia  and the tributary 
system); mainstream theories (all subcategories of 
constructivism, liberalism and realism); and other 
theories (critical IR theory, the English School, 
feminism, Marxism, post-colonial IR theory and 
security studies). All articles were accessed through 
the China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database.
As Figure 3 shows, the vast majority of the 
articles are analytical in nature and do not refer to 
any specific IR theory tradition. These articles might 
implicitly be influenced by certain assumptions 
derived from specific strains of IR theory, but they 
do not contribute anything in the way of theory 
innovation. This is likely due to the prominence in 
the survey of periodicals published by think tanks. 
China Institutes of Contemporary International 
Relations, one of the oldest and most prestigious 
think tanks in China, publishes both in Chinese and 
English with the latter mostly containing selected 
translations of the former. In general the articles 
published by think tanks show less interest in 
theory, use fewer footnotes, and mainly publish 
foreign policy analyses and area studies. These 
articles lack discernible theoretical foundation 
and, far from innovate new theory. Instead, there 
is a clear concentration of theoretically innovative 
articles in two periodicals: the Sinophone World 
Economics and Politics and the Anglophone 
Chinese Journal of International Politics.
As highlighted in Figure 4, although the 
Chinese paradigm is comparable in size to ‘other 
theories’, and the mainstream theories dominate. 
This suggests that the hegemonic position of 
mainstream IR theory in the Chinese IR community 
remains overall secure. Nonetheless, the Sinophone 
sample contains the largest percentage of content 
classified as belonging to the ‘Chinese paradigm’. 
Analysis and Discussion
Commenting on the nature of a stratified system, 
Amitav Acharya writes that, “dominance like 
hegemony, is sustained by coercion and consent, 







(Acharya, 2014, p.25). The prestige attributed to 
joining the club of the core, might explain why the 
Chinese IR community is so focused on the US 
community. Institutionally the Chinese IR community 
also retains strong bonds with its US counterpart 
through PhD scholarships and research foundations 
(Kristensen, 2015, p.238). So, what accounts for a 
Chinese paradigm emerging in spite of mainstream 
IR theories dominance? Apart from joining others 
in specialising in the US-dominated mainstream 
theory, making new theory is another way to be 
recognised by the Western gaze. As Qin Yaqing 
puts it, “In reality, US IR theory has consistently held 
a leading position in the world, and US theoretical 
research over the last 20 years or so has created 
a powerful tradition – the mainstream theories of 
IR. It is diff icult to become a part of mainstream IR 
theory without getting approved by US academic 
Figure 3. Orientation of content. 












circles” (emphasis added – Qin, 2012, p.16). Coining 
a new school that is not explicitly critical towards 
existing theories and does not purport to threaten 
the privileged position of Western IR theory 
represents another way of carving out a spot within 
the stratified structure of the academy. However, 
by taking Robert Cox’ (1981) maxim that “theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose” to heart 
without critical evaluation, the sanctioned sources of 
Chinese IR theory run the risk of reproducing tropes 
that are also found in Western-centric IR theory. 
Cultural exceptionalism
The sanctioned Chinese theories have been 
criticised for flirting with cultural exceptionalism. 
Zhao Tingyang’s tianxia  concept has been 
severely attacked, in the words of one reviewer, 
for “distorting [the past] in order to advance an 
equally distorted political agenda” (Dreyer, 2015, 
p.1031). Beyond charges against the theory as 
politically biased, Hun Joon Kim points out that a 
metanarrative of Hegelian dialectics is still at work: 
“[A]ll that is good and desirable – order, legitimacy, 
voluntary submission – are clustered within the 
Chinese traditional system, and what is bad and 
undesirable – anarchy, disorder, war – are inherent 
in the Westphalia system” (Kim, 2016, p.74). A 
world dominated by China, or at least by Chinese 
principles, comes to represent a superior scenario 
to that of a Hobbesian world of nation states. In the 
same way, Yan Xuetong also stops short of putting 
his theory in any critical context, but sees China 
as being the natural heir to a system dominated 
by great states and empires. What makes China 
diff erent from former dominating powers is the 
potential for following the lessons from ancient 
philosophy and becoming an ultra-moral power. 
However, the claim of moral superiority has, as 
some scholars point out (Hui 2012; Cunningham-
Cross and Callahan, 2011), also been a staple of 
former empires, whether it was referred to as 
the white man’s burden or a civilising mission.
Representational dilemmas 
A problem of representation also becomes clear 
by mainly identifying a Chinese School of IR with 
three scholars. All of them are male, ethnically 
Han Chinese and working at elite institutions in 
Beijing. Furthermore, they all take departure in 
ancient Chinese, mainly Confucian, philosophy. As 
a mirror image of the Jesuit missionary Matteo 
Ricci’s mistaken assumptions of religion in China as 
dominated by a monolithic Confucianism towering 
over Buddhism and Daoism (Chen, 2015), a label like 
a Chinese School also serves as a catch-all phrase 
to collapse nuances into one impossibly broad 
concept. Limiting a Chinese School to sanctioned 
sources prematurely excludes other potential 
sources such as those from China’s own cultural 
periphery: the Daoist feminism of L.H.M Ling (Ling, 
2014), perspectives from Taiwan (Shih, 2017; Chen, 
2011) or possible crosspollination from other social 
science fields such as the Chinese New Left (Weber 
2014). Lastly, there is a total erasure of non-Han 
perspectives despite large parts of Chinese history 
being dominated by nomad people – the Khitans, 
Xiongnu, Tibetans, Turkish, Mongols, and Manchus 
to name a few. Instead, Chinese culture is portrayed 
in an idealised, Confucian, Han-dominated form. 
Historical limitations
Apart from the erasure of non-Han history, the 
Chinese School also excludes more recent history. 
Even though Qin Yaqing includes revolutionary 
history in the development of IR in China (Qin, 
2011a, p.455), none of the sanctioned sources 
really make use of Chinese socialism or Maoism. 
An explanation might be a revolt against the 
ideological straitjackets of previous decades. One 
scholar’s evaluation of the previous decades is that, 
“Before the 1980s no real IR theory was taught 
in China. The so-called theory of international 
politics before then was just interpretations of the 
viewpoints of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao 
Zedong” (Song, 2001, p.63). The political socialist 







of IR” (Wang and Buzan, 2014, p.16).  Marxist theory 
is now often categorised as pre-theory (Hu, 2016; 
Wang and Buzan 2014; Qin 2011b). However, there 
might be a case for looking to recent intellectual, 
political thinkers to enrich a Chinese IR. As Daniel 
Vukovich argues, “[I]f postcolonial studies can read, 
say, Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire as inspirational 
historical figures, it is high time it did the same 
with Chinese and other Asian voices, from Hu 
Sheng or Mao himself to Ho Chi Minh” (Vukovich, 
2017, p.10). As an example, Mao was influenced 
by Chinese tradition but had an outspokenly 
international outlook – drawing on Chinese 
tradition, hybridising theories and recognising the 
role of subalterns in history and politics (Dirlik, 
2014). Overcoming cultural essentialism, Mao has 
been instrumental in the ‘sinicisation of Marxism’ 
making it an at once distinctly Chinese and 
Marxist product. Furthermore, Mao structured his 
criticism of imperialism from a specific Chinese 
vantage point (Deckers, 1996). As an intellectual 
figure, Mao might still contribute to develop a 
Chinese take on critical and postcolonial IR theory.
Conclusion
The international IR community remains Western-
centric whether viewed from an institutional or an 
ideational perspective. For all the debate about 
a Chinese School of IR theory, this paper shows 
that Western mainstream IR theory continues to 
dominate within China. Striving for global IR is an 
exciting and worthwhile project, but more problems 
than possibilities arise from forming national 
schools that are defined in exclusive terms. Despite 
its goal of being seen as a wholly indigenous 
movement, the Chinese School of IR does not 
exist in a vacuum. Non-Chinese scholars initiated 
the research project that sparked Qin Yaqing’s 
research (Acharya and Buzan, 2007), just as several 
non-Chinese scholars seek to develop tianxia 
theory using the case of US hegemony (Babones, 
2017; Khong, 2013). The Chinese School also does 
not exist as a purely intellectual pursuit removed 
from domestic political interests (Xie, 2011). It is 
influenced by the drive of younger scholars to gain 
recognition globally (Kristensen 2015, p.243) and by 
prominent scholars, who wish to carve out a spot in 
the stratified international IR structure. As a result, 
the sanctioned Chinese theories almost seem to 
reproduce mainstream IR theory only with Chinese 
characteristics such as the great power politics of 
moral realism (realism), the hyper-institutionalism 
of tianxia  (liberalism) and Qin Yaqing’s subjective-
focused relationalism (constructivism). This is 
the consequence of joining a stratified system 
on its own terms. The social process of achieving 
recognition delineates what constitutes Chinese IR 
theory and reproduces the system by unavoidably 
leaving non-sanctioned theories on the fringes. 
As Kristensen points out, theory speak from non-
Western IR scholars does not deliver the radical 
diff erence usually expected from scholars based 
in a diff erent context. There are no “ ‘third world 
radicals’ or indigenous theorisers in mainstream 
journals, rather it often looks like ‘social science 
socialised’ disciplined by a mainstream discipline” 
(Kristensen, 2015, p.236). If the discipline truly 
wants to let a thousand flowers bloom and a 
hundred schools contend, it might be beneficial 
to look beyond the national school narrative 
and work to foster new connections between 
peripheral actors within the stratified system.
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